S&P ПОДТВЕРДИЛО РЕЙТИНГИ КАЗАХСТАНА
28.04.99 00:00
/Алматинское бюро REUTERS, 28.04.99/ - Рейтинговое агентство Standard
& Poor' s подтвердило Казахстану долгосрочный рейтинг эмитента в
иностранной валюте и основной негарантированный рейтинг на уровне
"B+" и долгосрочный рейтинг эмитента в местной валюте на уровне "ВВ-",
говорится в сообщении агентства.
S&P также подтвердило Казахстану краткосрочные рейтинги в иностранной
и местной валюте на уровне "В".
Прогноз рейтингов - негативный, говорится в сообщении.
Ниже приводится полный текст пресс-релиза Standard & Poor's:
NEW YORK, April 28 - Standard & Poor's today affirmed its single- ' В' -plus
long-term foreign currency issuer credit and senior unsecured debt ratings, and
its double- ' В' -minus long-term local currency issuer credit rating on the
Republic of Kazakhstan.
Standard & Poor's also affirmed its 'B' short-term foreign-currency and local
currency ratings on Kazakhstan. The outlook is negative. Kazakhstan's ratings
are constrained by:
- Limited fiscal flexibility.
Budget deficits are high-although partly as an inevitable result of a much
needed pension reform.
Excluding privatization receipts, the budget deficit for 1999 has been set
initially at 6.2% of GDP.
The challenges, however, are formidable. The recent sharp devaluation of the
Tenge (following the decision to free float the Tenge at the beginning of
April) is likely to require further stringent budgetary measures only weeks
after parliament reluctantly agreed on savings measures In the face of a
rapidly weakening economy.
In addition, noninflationary financing, mostly in the form of privatization
proceeds and foreign borrowing, is less readily available than before.
Privatization receipts. Initially projected at 3% of GDP, are reliant on the
planned revival of last year's stalled blue chip privatization program, which,
however, will be very challenging owing to continued weak Investor interest
In emerging markets.
- Significant balance of payments rigidities. With continued limited pipeline
capacity and Russia (Kazakhstan's key trading partner) in deep recession,
prospects to widen the export base and increase volumes are restricted, despite
the more competitive currency.
Although the devaluation should help to restore growth and narrow the trade
deficit over time, Kazakhstan's current account.
At the same time, foreign direct Investment (ТОН, which has financed the entire
current account deficit in past years, has become more scarce.
Investors are unlikely to withdraw from ongoing projects. However, obtaining
new commitments may require the government to offer stakes in key commodity
projects or strategic enterprises (such as Kazakhoil) in addition to the
revived blue chip privatization program.
- A fragile external liquidity position. Official foreign currency reserves
stood at $1.2 billion at the beginning of April 1999.
Foreign reserve losses owing to official intervention should be limited
following the change in the policy stance of the National Bank.
Current official foreign currency reserves, however, cover only about 30% of
the estimated external financing gap for 1999 (including a current deficit of
about $1 billion, about $940 million debt amortization, and $2 billion of
short- term external debt-the latter, however, also Includes about $1.3 billion
in external company arrears mostly vis-a-vis other CIS creditors).
Excluding external company arrears, the coverage remains at a more
comfortable 47%.
- The need to Improve the quality of governance and institutions, which is key
given the concentration of excessive powers in the hands of a very few policy
makers.
In this challenging situation, Kazakhstan's ratings continue to be supported by
the authorities' substantial progress in transforming the Kazakh economy into a
market-based system, and in reducing inflation to an estimated average of 12%
in 1999.
In addition, key public sector reforms have advanced, while appropriate policy
responses are expected to keep general government debt and total net external
debt at relatively manageable levels, with 20% of GDP and 80% of exports,
respectively, at year-end 1999.
OUTLOOK: NEGATIVE
The outlook indicates that a downgrade could occur If the challenging
environment translates into unorthodox policy responses and unchecked fiscal
deterioration.
A more positive view on the rating depends on the extent to which the
authorities continue to be able to produce adequate measures that alleviate
financial pressures.
In the face of the sharp Tenge devaluation, continued strict monetary and
fiscal policy will be required to strengthen confidence, and avoid soaring
inflation and further pressure on the currency.
Renewed sustainable output growth, more successful privatization, and stronger
FDI Inflows than appear likely at the moment would also underpin the rating.
Standard & Poor's said.